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I n this paper, we describe the broad contours of constitutional change in the UK over the last decades. We also ask the question, 
what can and should courts do 
when faced with ‘unconstitutional’ 
legislation? We present the case for 
the development of a modest range of 
new constitutional review powers for 
the courts in the coming years.
The traditional role of the 
courts: subordination to 
Parliament
In the UK, there is no codif ied 
constitution setting out the role 
and powers of the judiciary. As a 
consequence, such powers have 
traditionally had to be inferred or 
induced from par t icular judicial 
decisions.
Historically, Britain’s mixed model 
of government firmly subordinated 
the judiciary to the elected branches 
of government. The constitutional 
h i e ra r chy,  w h i ch  s t ems  f ro m 
the  doc t r ine  of  par l iamentar y 
sovereignty, conceived of the courts 
as subordinate to Parliament. Courts 
were to interpret the text and to 
declare the law, and they enjoyed 
only l imited review powers over 
delegated authority by Parliament to 
subordinate bodies. 
The impact of this subordination 
on the constitutional status of the 
courts has been enormous. Between 
1842 and the UK’s accession to the 
European Community in January 1973, 
not a single case reached the House of 
Lords on the question of the absence 
of limitations of Parliament’s ultimate 
law-making authority. The period from 
World War II until the 1960s highlights 
the insignificance of the courts in 
developing the constitution. 
The Development 
of Powers of ‘Quasi-
Constitutional’ Review
Judicial  expansion in the lat ter 
decades of the twentieth century 
have prompted a re-evaluation of the 
constitutional position of the judiciary. 
Over this period, the apex cour t 
gradually developed a public law 
profile, such that the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court (Supreme Court) can 
now be seen to discharge functions 
equivalent to those of a constitutional 
court. 
S o m e  o f  t h e s e  n e w,  ‘qua s i -
constitutional’ powers of the Supreme 
Court have been given to the court 
explicitly by Parliament. For example, 
the Supreme Court has been allocated 
powers of quasi-constitutional review 
under the European Communities Act 
1972 (ECA), the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA), and the UK’s devolution 
legislation. 
As regards the European Communities 
Act, Parliament’s competence has 
been substantively limited in two 
ways: f irst, it may not legislate 
contrary to EU law; and second, courts 
enjoy power to ‘disapply’ national law 
to the extent that it is inconsistent 
with directly effective provisions of 
EU law. It is acting in this capacity 
that the Supreme Court most clearly 
discharges functions akin to the strong 
form judicial review exercised by 
constitutional courts elsewhere.  
When courts review legislation under 
the HRA, the consequences are slightly 
different. That legislation permits 
courts to interpret primary legislation 
in order to achieve compliance with 
the Convention Rights, while providing 
for the issue of a declaration of 
incompatibility as an alternative. 
Though neither option permits the 
court to mount a direct challenge to 
the legality of an Act of Parliament, the 
HRA nonetheless empowers the courts 
to test legislation for compliance with 
human rights standards.
Under the Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005, the courts also have the 
power to determine legal disputes 
relating to ‘devolution issues’ arising 
out of the transfer of legal powers to 
devolved bodies, such as the Scottish 
Par l iament, the Welsh Nat ional 
Assembly, or the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. 
In addit ion to those powers of 
quasi-constitutional review allocated 
by statute, the expansion of the 
constitutional powers of the courts 
has occurred as a result of the 
decisions of judges themselves. At the 
Over the last few decades, the UK has experienced a 
profound – if quiet – constitutional transformation. 
The judicial reception of EU law, for instance, has been 
described as ‘one of the most fundamental realignments of 
the constitutional order since the end of the seventeenth 
century’. But these developments have hardly been 
appreciated within broader public debates, which remain 
rooted in/anchored to notions of parliamentary sovereignty.
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most straightforward level, a judicial 
belief in the ‘sanctity’ of statutory 
language has yielded ground to more 
generous and purposive techniques 
of  cons t ruc t ion .  Rathe r  more 
fundamentally, the development of 
ideas associated with the ‘common 
law constitution’ – including the 
incremental development by the courts 
of a body of ‘constitutional rights’, 
and the creation of a distinction 
between constitutional and non-
constitutional statutes – have rendered 
our traditional understandings of the 
subordinate role of courts in relation 
to Parliament obsolete. 
Indeed, in one significant case, Lord 
Hoffman went so far as to assert that 
the Supreme Court is now empowered 
to ‘apply principles of constitutionality 
little different from those which exist 
in countries where the power of the 
legislature is expressly limited by a 
constitutional document.’ Even if this 
is something of an overstatement, it 
is certainly true that unquestioning 
acceptance by the courts of legislative 
direction – however Draconian – may 
no longer be taken for granted under 
this new constitutional equilibrium.
What powers of review 
should courts have?
Any future determination of the 
respective constitutional role and 
function of the judiciary must then 
seek to address the tension between 
the sovereignty of Parliament and the 
rule of law by approaching them as 
equals, and should seek to make good 
the constitutional commitment to both 
democratic government and the rule 
of law.  
In our view, it would be a step too far 
for the Supreme Court to assert the 
ability to strike down legislation. This 
would be a clear usurpation of the 
powers of the legislature. Instead, we 
see three legitimate judicial responses 
to Parliament doing the ‘unthinkable’ 
– for instance, passing legislation 
that disenfranchised a substantial 
proportion of the population on 
arbitrary grounds or insulated vast 
tranches of governmental activity from 
the scrutiny of the courts.
The most robust course available 
to the court is disobedience. In the 
exceptional case of a clash between 
constitutional fundamentals, the 
court may, for example, reinstate 
a jurisdiction apparently ousted by 
statute, or prevent the attempted 
insulation by statute of otherwise 
ultra vires activity from judicial review. 
This approach draws inspiration from 
the seminal decision in Anisminic v. 
Foreign Compensation Commission, 
as long ago as 1969. While falling 
shor t of US-sty le const itut ional 
review, the possibility of this form 
of judicial disobedience to primary 
legislation remains the most potent 
weapon available to the Supreme 
Court in the event of a fundamental 
constitutional clash. 
Sitting below outright disobedience, in 
legal terms at least, would be a judicial 
‘declaration of unconstitutionality.’ 
Drawing inspiration from declarations 
of incompatibility under the HRA, 
David Jenkins has argued that the 
courts possess the inherent power 
to declare Acts of Parliament to be 
unconstitutional when Parliament 
legislates contrary to fundamental 
that are deemed by courts to be 
fundamental to the UK’s unwritten 
const itut ion. Such declarat ions, 
Jenkins argues, would be respectful 
of sovereignty, because they would be 
not affect the formal legal validity of 
the statute in respect of which they 
were made.
The consequences of the issue of a 
‘declaration of unconstitutionality’ 
would not be as severe as those 
of judicial disobedience.  Such a 
declaration would in many cases 
be politically damaging, and could 
therefore provoke a legis lat ive 
response. But there would be no 
requi rement  for  Par l iament  to 
respond, the impugned statute would 
remain operable.  The declaration of 
unconstitutionality would, therefore, 
better straddle the principle of judicial 
control and the principle of legislative 
supremacy, and offer greater respect 
to the political underpinnings of the 
UK constitution. 
Finally, the courts may in certain 
constitutional cases need to soften 
the letter of the law through careful 
interpretation in order to achieve 
fairness in individual cases and to 
vindicate the judicial presumption that 
Parliament legislates ‘for a European 
liberal democracy’ in compliance 
with fundamental principles. Like 
equity, which mitigates the rigour 
of the common law, the rule of law 
ensures that the formal legal doctrine 
of Parliamentary sovereignty does not 
lose sight of constitutional principles 
that are of fundamental importance in 
individual circumstances. 
In our view, a combination of these 
three opt ions,  used caut ious ly 
and in the appropriate context, 
would represent a legitimate and 
desirable development of the courts’ 
constitutional powers. The courts share 
in the task of policing the boundaries 
of a rights-based democracy with the 
legislature and executive; their role is 
complementary to that of Parliament, 
and of the executive. To decry the 
quasi-constitutional functions of 
the courts as a step towards judicial 
supremacism is to deny the distinctive 
functions of the legislative and judicial 
branches. It also denies the crucial 
constitutional role of the courts in their 
habitual recognition of Parliament as 
sovereign. The constitutional functions 
and authority of the courts, therefore, 
form the embodiment of the balanced 
constitution in its modern incarnation.
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